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 NOTE 
The Eighth Circuit Allows a Child Tax 
Credit Exemption in Bankruptcy 
Proceedings: A Minty Fresh Start or Abuse 
of the System? 
Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015). 
REBEKAH KELLER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Between 2014 and 2015, bankruptcy filings across the country de-
creased over ten percent.1  In the Eighth Circuit, bankruptcy filing rates have 
dropped from 57,746 in 2014 to 51,301 in 2015.2  The decrease in filings in 
the Eighth Circuit is telling when compared to the filing statistics from 2008 
and 2009 in the same circuit: in 2008, bankruptcy filings in the Eighth Circuit 
reached 73,677, and in 2009, filings reached 90,539.3  During the height of 
the economic downturn in the United States, bankruptcy filings nationwide 
increased almost thirty-two percent from 2008 to 2009.4  Even though filings 
rates are slowly decreasing across the nation, American citizens are still feel-
ing the effects of the economic crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2009.  
While there are numerous reasons debtors file for bankruptcy, the market 
crash in 2008 and the subsequent economic downturn can be attributed to 
many individuals’ financial problems. 
 
* B.A., Macalester College, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2017.  Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I would 
like to offer a sincere thank you to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for her constant 
support and guidance throughout law school, particularly through the learning, writ-
ing, and editing process of this Note. 
 1. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Bankruptcy Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pend-
ing—During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2014 and 2015, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f/bankruptcy-filings/2015/09/30 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2016) (bankruptcy filings have decreased nationally 10.7%). 
 2. Id.  The data for 2014 bankruptcy filings was collected from October 1, 
2013, through September 30, 2014.  Id.  Data for 2015 was collected from October 1, 
2014, through September 30, 2015.  Id. 
 3. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Bankruptcy Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pend-
ing—During the 12-Month Periods Ending December 31, 2008 and 2009, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f/bankruptcy-filings/2009/12/31 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2016).  This is an increase of 22.9% over one year.  Id. 
 4. Id. 
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With money problems still pervasive in American society, and bank-
ruptcy filing rates still so high, there are few ways in which debtors can re-
cover from such drastic economic situations.  Bankruptcy protection is one of 
the most common ways debtors facing insurmountable economic difficulties 
can pull themselves out of debt.  The bankruptcy code is designed to give a 
fresh start to those in near financial ruin by ensuring they are unencumbered 
by past debt.  One way to accomplish this fresh start is by a discharge of 
debts that are not paid in bankruptcy proceedings.5  Another way to achieve 
this fresh start is through the exemption scheme. 
Exemption schemes vary from state to state, but they generally allow 
debtors to keep their assets to continue a socially acceptable standard of liv-
ing.6  This Note addresses a common source of relief that most debtors take 
advantage of when filing for bankruptcy: exemption statutes and its applica-
bility to low-income debtors who qualify for “public assistance benefits” and 
income-based tax credits.  One exemption that commonly appears in federal 
and state exemption schemes is the public assistance benefit.7  While com-
monly included in exemption statutes, public assistance benefits are not often 
defined within these statutes; however, the most basic definition of a public 
assistance benefit is a form of financial aid for the “needy.”8  The scope of 
public assistance benefits has been a subject of scrutiny for years.9  Currently, 
there is a hopeless split among bankruptcy courts across the country in de-
termining whether the Child Tax Credit constitutes a public assistance benefit 
or not.  The Eighth Circuit is the first appellate court to take up this issue. 
Part II of this Note examines the issues presented in the instant case, 
Hardy v. Fink, in which the Eighth Circuit became the first circuit court to 
include the Child Tax Credit as a “public assistance benefit” under the Mis-
souri exemption statute in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Part III explores the 
 
 5. This is not within scope of this Note, but see generally A. Mechele Dicker-
son, Lifestyles of the Not-so-Rich or Famous: the Role of Choice or Sacrifice in Bank-
ruptcy, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 629 (1997). 
 6. Some argue these exemption schemes are overly generous and rather than 
giving a fresh start, actually provide a head start to these debtors post-bankruptcy.  
See Elijah M. Alper, Note, Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy: How BAPCPA May 
Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (2007); Timothy D. 
Moratzka, Fresh Start, Head Start, or Running Start: Bankruptcy Exemption Plan-
ning, 22-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (2003); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen 
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains 
or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995). 
 7. 11 U.S.C. §522(d) (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-603(3) (West 2016); 735 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-1001(g)(1) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8)(a) 
(West 2016); MO ANN. STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a) (West 2016). 
 8. See Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 723 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), 
rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 9. Many debtors across the country put the question before the bankruptcy court 
as to whether the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and the Adoption 
Tax Credit constitute public assistance benefits for the purposes of bankruptcy ex-
emption schemes.  See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
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applicable laws, legislative history, and recent case law that addressed these 
issues.  Part IV explores the Hardy decision’s in-depth examination of the 
legislative history surrounding the Child Tax Credit and the underlying pur-
pose behind including public assistance benefits in both state and federal ex-
emption schemes.  Part V offers a framework for analyzing exemption 
schemes across the country by examining the Missouri exemption scheme 
and attempting to provide clarity in the current statute for debtors and courts 
in the future. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Pepper Minthia Hardy, sole provider for a family of four,10 filed for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in October 2012.11  As part of her filing, she was re-
quired to complete an array of forms, each setting out her assets, debts, and 
income.12  On her Schedule B,13 she indicated that she was expecting an in-
come tax refund, part of which was to be from a Child Tax Credit (“CTC”).14  
Ms. Hardy estimated that her total income tax refund would be $4950.15  In 
her bankruptcy filing, she indicated that $4895 of her expected $4950 return16 
was to be exempt from her bankruptcy estate.17 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri estab-
lished that Ms. Hardy’s actual federal income tax refund was $6311.18  Of 
this $6311 refund, $2000 was from a CTC19 that Ms. Hardy listed as exempt 
from her Chapter 13 bankruptcy as a “public assistance benefit” under Mis-
souri bankruptcy exemption laws.20  The trustee handling Ms. Hardy’s Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy objected to Ms. Hardy’s claim that a portion of her federal 
income tax refund attributable to the CTC was exempt from the reach of her 
 
 10. Pepper Hardy claimed two dependent children under the age of seventeen 
and a dependent brother on her 2012 taxes.  In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 442 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722, rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. A Schedule B document is a list debtors are required to make of all their 
personal items and their value.  Bankruptcy Forms, Schedule A/B: Property (individ-
uals), U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/schedule-ab-
property-individuals (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
 14. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 442. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Ms. Hardy claimed $595 under the Missouri wild card exemption, $2300 as a 
head of household exemption, and $2000 attributable to the Child Tax Credit as a 
public assistance benefit.  Id. at 441 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 513.430.1(3), .440, 
.430.1(10)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2013)). 
 17. Id. at 442. 
 18. Id. 
 19. This credit is actually referred to as the Additional Child Tax Credit, which 
will be addressed infra Part III. 
 20. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 442; § 513.430.1(10)(a). 
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creditors.21  The bankruptcy court consolidated Ms. Hardy’s case with anoth-
er Chapter 13 case raising the same issue.22 
In the accompanying case, Larry and Tara Lovelace filed for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy in October 2012.23  On their Schedule B, Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace 
indicated they would be receiving an income tax refund, part of which would 
be attributable to a CTC.24  Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace claimed three dependent 
children on their federal and state income tax returns.25  The bankruptcy court 
established that Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace were to receive a federal tax refund of 
$4391.26  Of their $4391 federal refund, $3000 of it was attributable to the 
CTC.27  Like Ms. Hardy, Mr. and Mrs. Lovelace listed the CTC as exempt 
from their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding as a public assistance benefit.28  
The trustee for the Lovelaces’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy objected to the exemp-
tion of the CTC from their bankruptcy estate.29 
In its memorandum opinion, the bankruptcy court sustained the trustees’ 
objections in both the Hardy and Lovelace cases to the exemption of a CTC 
as a public assistance benefit.30  The court held that, based on the legislative 
history of the CTC and Missouri’s bankruptcy exemption laws, the CTC was 
not a valid public assistance benefit that could be exempted from bankruptcy 
estates.31  The court then addressed multiple Missouri cases in which debtors 
have attempted to persuade the bankruptcy court that the CTC was a public 
assistance benefit.32  None of the debtors in the cited cases were successful in 
doing so, and the court remained unconvinced in the cases at bar.33 
Ms. Hardy then appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit.34  The Bankruptcy Appel-
 
 21. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 443. 
 22. Id. at 441. 
 23. Id. at 442. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 443. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 447. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 444–45. 
 33. Id. at 444. 
 34. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 723–24 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), 
rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015).  When appealing a decision from the federal 
bankruptcy court, a petitioner can appeal to the federal district court or to the Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel for the district in which the debtor resides.  Appeals, U.S. 
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases/appeals.  The Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel is a panel of court of appeals judges and district court judges 
who are considered to be specialists in bankruptcy law and hear bankruptcy court 
appeals.  Id.  In order to take an appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, both par-
ties must agree to the venue.  Id. 
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late Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order sustaining the trustee’s ob-
jection to the debtor’s claimed exemption.35  The sole issue on appeal was 
Ms. Hardy’s claimed exemption of the $2000 CTC from her 2012 federal tax 
return.36  Ms. Hardy argued that the CTC fit within the common meaning of a 
public assistance benefit, which she argued was “quite plainly an assistance 
that benefits the public.”37  The court stated that the statute, legislative histo-
ry, and dictionary did not support Ms. Hardy’s proffered definition of a pub-
lic assistance benefit.38  The court instead relied on a Merriam-Webster’s 
dictionary that defined a public assistance benefit as: “government aid to 
needy, aged, or disabled persons and to dependent children.”39  Under its 
definition of a public assistance benefit, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held 
that the CTC was not a public assistance benefit under Missouri law and, 
therefore, could not be exempted from her bankruptcy estate.40 
Ms. Hardy appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.41  The court, though still not 
persuaded by Ms. Hardy’s proffered definition of a public assistance benefit 
under Missouri law, ultimately ruled in Ms. Hardy’s favor.42  The court relied 
on the legislative intent and history of the amendments to the CTC instead of 
previous case law based on older versions of the CTC.43  This decision made 
the Eighth Circuit the first circuit court to rule in a debtor’s favor regarding 
the CTC exemption.44  The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court’s order 
sustaining the trustee’s objection to the debtor’s exemptions.45  The court 
held that the true legislative intent behind the CTC statute was to benefit low-
income families, which fit within Missouri’s public assistance benefit exemp-
tion statute, and the credit should be exempt from Ms. Hardy’s bankruptcy 
estate.46 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The legislative history of the United States Code is filled with attempts 
to provide aid, support, and tax assistance to low-income or impoverished 
citizens.  These attempts are clearly established in the legislative history of 
 
 35. In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 726. 
 36. Id. at 724. 
 37. Id. at 725. 
 38. Id. at 725–26. 
 39. Id. at 725 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (11th 
ed. 2012)). 
 40. Id. at 726. 
 41. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 42. Id. at 1190–91. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id.; In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 
722 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189. 
 45. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1191. 
 46. Id. 
5
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both the federal bankruptcy laws and the federal tax laws.  Because both the 
bankruptcy code and the tax code are integral to the decision in the instant 
case, it is important to establish a basic understanding of how each statute 
operates in this context and how the statutes affect individuals in Missouri.  
This Part establishes a framework of the bankruptcy laws relevant to debtors’ 
exemption claims, paying particular attention to the differences between the 
federal bankruptcy code’s exemption scheme and Missouri’s exemption stat-
utes.  Next, it analyzes the CTC in the tax code, focusing on the legislature’s 
intent in enacting the law and tracing how it has evolved over time.  Finally, 
this Part discusses how lower courts have addressed the issue of whether the 
CTC is included within the definition of public assistance benefits. 
A.  Bankruptcy and Exemption Statutes 
Title XI of the United States Code sets forth the federal bankruptcy stat-
utes.47  Title XI also designates the different types of bankruptcy filings 
available.48  An individual debtor may file for bankruptcy under three differ-
ent code chapters: Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13.49  Debtors’ first 
duties under each filing option are to report all income, personal property, 
and other assets in their bankruptcy petitions.50 
As part of filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,51 debtors are also required 
to propose a bankruptcy plan.52  The plan lays out all of the debtors’ assets 
that are included in the bankruptcy estate,53 as well as any exemptions that 
debtors may have to exclude from the estate.54  It then establishes all allowa-
ble deductions and formulates the remaining amount as disposable income.55  
This disposable income then goes toward funding debtors’ bankruptcy plans, 
which shows how much each creditor will be paid over a three or five year 
period.56  In Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, debtors retain all their assets 
– even those that are not exempted from the bankruptcy estate.57  The debt-
 
 47. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2016). 
 48. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1101, 1301 (2012). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. A debtor or debtor organization may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 
or Chapter 11; however, this Note focuses on the organization and structure of Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy proceedings only because that was the subject of the instant case. 
 52. 11 U.S.C.A § 1322.  The plan is an organization of the debtor’s assets and 
responsibilities.  Id.  This works to provide a strategy for repaying the debtor’s credi-
tors during the bankruptcy proceedings.  Id. 
 53. Id.  The “bankruptcy estate” is the term used for the compilation of the debt-
or’s assets and incomes that are applied to the debtor’s debts in the plan.  11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 541.  It is created by operation of law pursuant to I.R.C. § 541 (West 2016). 
 54. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012). 
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ors’ estates are then assigned trustees who are in charge of obtaining a pay-
ment each month from the debtors and using those funds to pay creditors in 
accordance with the plan.58   
Generally, all property in debtors’ estates is available to pay creditors; 
however, debtors can exempt certain portions of their property from their 
bankruptcy estates.59  Section 522 of Title XI establishes allowable exemp-
tions.60  In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, non-exempt property must be 
turned over to the bankruptcy trustee.61  This property will be distributed and 
sold to creditors.62  Under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, debtors are 
required to pay at least as much to their unsecured creditors as they would 
have received under a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding.63  Although debtors 
keep all their property whether exempt or not in Chapter 13, exemptions are 
very important in determining how much debtors must pay to creditors over 
the life of the bankruptcy plan.64  Generally, debtors can choose either the 
federal bankruptcy exemption scheme, set forth in Section 522(d) of the 
bankruptcy code, or their state’s allowable exemptions, whichever is great-
er.65  However, states may “opt out” of the federal exemption scheme and 
force debtors domiciled in that state to choose its own exemptions.66 
Missouri has opted out of the Section 522 exemptions in favor of adopt-
ing its own exemption scheme that applies to all Missouri residents who file 
for bankruptcy.67  Missouri’s exemptions statute is comprehensive68 and in-
cludes an exemption for debtors’ rights to receive “[a] Social Security benefit, 
unemployment compensation or a public assistance benefit.”69  The term 
“public assistance benefit” is not defined within the statute.70  In fact, until 
 
 58. Id. § 1302 (2013); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322.  A debtor’s disposable income con-
sists of the debtor’s income less allowed expenses for the six-month period preceding 
the bankruptcy filing.  11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West). 
 59. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522. 
 60. Id.  Some common exemptions include: debtors’ interests in real estate-up to 
a certain value; interest in a motor vehicle-up to a certain value; jewelry used primari-
ly for personal or family reasons; and furniture, appliances, and clothing-up to a cer-
tain value.  Id. § 522(d)(1)–(5). 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 704. 
 62. Secured creditors are paid back before unsecured creditors.  Id. § 502.  Cer-
tain unsecured creditors have priority over other unsecured creditors.  11 U.S.C.A. § 
507. 
 63. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(4).  This means that in order to establish how and 
how much each of the creditors will be paid in a Chapter 13 proceeding, debtors’ plan 
must determine how much each of the debtors’ unsecured creditors would have re-
ceived if the debtors had filed under Chapter 7 instead.  Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 522. 
 66. Id. § 522(b). 
 67. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.427 (2000). 
 68. MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 513.430 (West 2016). 
 69. Id. § 513.430.1(10)(a). 
 70. Id. 
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2012 the statute read “local public assistance benefit.”71  The removal of the 
word “local” in 2012 expanded the scope of Missouri’s allowable exemp-
tions.72  Bankruptcy courts have already determined that some federal tax 
credits constitute public assistance benefits, such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the Adoption Tax Credit.73  Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts still 
must look to Missouri’s exemption statutes to determine whether these feder-
al tax credits are exemptible for Missouri debtors. 
B.  The Evolution of the Child Tax Credit 
Congress adopted the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) as it exists today 
in 1986 in a complete overhaul of the internal revenue laws in the United 
States.74  In order to determine a taxpayer’s federal taxes each year, the Code 
established a formula that starts with the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income75 
and subtracts from it any deductions that the taxpayer might have to yield 
taxable income.76  Once a taxpayer’s taxable income is determined, the tenta-
tive tax liability can be established.77 
A taxpayer’s tax liability can then be reduced by credits against the ten-
tative tax.78  There are three types of tax credits: nonrefundable, refundable, 
and a combined non-refundable/refundable credit.79  Nonrefundable tax cred-
its can be applied only to reduce outstanding tax liability80 to zero dollars; 
any leftover nonrefundable tax credit disappears and cannot be returned to the 
 
 71. In re Corbett, No. 13–60042, 2013 WL 1344717, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
Apr. 2, 2013). 
 72. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 73. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  See also In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 783 
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2014); In re Johnson, 480 B.R. 305, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 74. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. 
 75. Another example of a combined tax credit is the American Opportunity Tax 
Credit.  I.R.C. § 25A(i) (2015); REV. PROC. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, §3.05. 
 76. I.R.C. § 63 (West 2016). 
 77. Id. § 26(b)(1). 
 78. I.R.C. § 21 (2012).  There are three ways to reduce tax liability: the first is 
through “above the line deductions,” which are deductions taken from the taxpayer’s 
taxable income before reaching adjusted gross income; the second set of deductions, 
often referred to as below the line deductions, or, alternatively, as itemized deduc-
tions, are deducted after adjusted gross income, and result in taxable income.  An 
Overview of Tax Deductions, IRS, https://www.irs.com/articles/overview-tax-
deductions (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).  Taxable income is the taxpayer’s tax base.  
See id.  It is multiplied by progressive tax rates to establish tentative tax liability.  Id.  
Finally, credits are applied against a taxpayer’s tentative tax liability to yield the 
amount owed to the government.  Id.  Credits are preferred over deductions because 
they reduce tax liability dollar-for-dollar, whereas deductions reduce income before 
applying progressive tax rates and are then worth less to the taxpayer.  See id. 
 79. I.R.C. §§ 21, 31 (2012). 
 80. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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taxpayer as a refund.81  With refundable credits on the other hand, a taxpayer 
can receive a refund of any remaining tax credit once the taxpayer’s liability 
is reduced to zero dollars.82  Credits that are a combination of nonrefundable 
and refundable credits can directly reduce tax liability and provide a partial 
cash refund once liability is reduced to zero dollars.83  The CTC is an exam-
ple of a combined tax credit.84 
Congress adopted the CTC in 1997.85  It was initially adopted as a 
means to “reduce the individual income tax burden of [families with depend-
ent children, to] better recognize the financial responsibilities of raising de-
pendent children, and [to] promote family values.”86  The CTC established a 
$500 credit per qualifying child for parents87 with three or more children 
whose modified adjusted gross income fit within certain limits.88  The CTC 
was originally codified as a nonrefundable credit.89  However, it has gone 
through several substantial amendments since 1997, including the supplement 
of the Additional Child Tax Credit (“ACTC”), the term for the inclusion of a 
refundable portion of the CTC.90 
In 2001, Congress increased the CTC from $500 per child to $600.91  
The CTC also became available to all families, not just those with three or 
more children.92  In addition, Congress created a refundable portion of the 
CTC, the ACTC.93  This created a tax refund of ten percent of the taxpayer’s 
earned income minus the refundability threshold, up to the maximum amount 
available to the taxpayer per qualifying child.94 
 
 81. Id. (discussing the use of nonrefundable credits). 
 82. Id. at 443–44 (discussing the application of the refundable earned income tax 
credit). 
 83. Id. (discussing the use of the CTC). 
 84. I.R.C. § 24 (West 2016); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §201, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47. 
 85. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L 105–34, § 101, 111 Stat. 788 (codified 
as amended at I.R.C. § 24). 
 86. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015) (alteration 
in original) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 310 (1997)). 
 87. Only taxpayers with families of three or more children under age seventeen 
could qualify for the CTC originally.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 101. 
 88. I.R.C. §24(b)(1).  The threshold income amounts are: $55,000 for married 
filing separately; $75,000 for head of household; and $110,000 for married filing 
jointly.  Id. § 24(b)(2).  This threshold is the point in a taxpayer’s income where the 
credit begins to be scaled down-$50 for every $1000 above the threshold amount.  Id. 
 89. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 101. 
 90. I.R.C. § 24(d). 
 91. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, § 201, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  The refundability threshold was $10,000.  Id. 
9
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Then in 2003, Congress increased the CTC to $1000 per child, which 
was extended in 2004.95  Additionally, Congress increased the refundable 
ACTC from ten percent of earned income over $10,000 to fifteen percent.96  
In 2008, Congress again amended the ACTC, reducing the refundability 
threshold amount of earned income from $10,000 to $8500.97  This threshold 
amount was again reduced in 2009 to $3000.98  These amendments “enabled 
more low-income earners to claim a refund and increased the refund amount 
for many low-income earners who previously were receiving a small re-
fund.”99 
The ACTC is easiest to understand through an example.  Taxpayers are 
a married couple who earned $25,000 in income and have four qualifying 
children.  Their CTC would be a maximum of $4000, $1000 per qualifying 
child.  In order to calculate the refundable portion, the tax code requires the 
taxpayers to subtract from their earned income the refundability threshold of 
$3000, which reduced their income for the credit to $22,000.  Multiply this 
income amount by the fifteen percent refundability percentage, which yields 
$3300.  Thus, $3300 of their available $4000 of CTC is refundable to the 
taxpayers.  So, if the taxpayers’ tax liability is $500, the remaining $700 
available through the nonrefundable portion of the CTC can wipeout the tax-
payers’ tax liability to $0.  The remaining $200 of the credit is lost. 
C.  Recent Developments in the Lower Courts 
Whether the CTC and ACTC fit within the scope of public assistance 
benefits in bankruptcy has been debated in federal bankruptcy courts across 
the country, and there remains a split of authority on the issue.100  In 2001, in 
In re Steinmetz, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho ruled that 
the CTC could not be exempted in bankruptcy as public assistance type aid, 
 
 95. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 
§ 101, 117 Stat. 752, 753; Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-311, §§ 101–02, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167–68. 
 96. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 §§ 101–02. 
 97. Emergency Economic Stabilization—Energy Improvement and Extension—
Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 501, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3876 (2008). 
 98. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
1003, 123 Stat. 115, 313.  In 2010, Congress extended this minimum threshold 
through tax years 2011 and 2012.  Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthoriza-
tion, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 103, 124 Stat. 3296, 3299. 
 99. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 100. Compare In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 527–28 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003), In re 
Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523, 526–28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014), and In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 
783, 791–92 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2014), with In re Steinmetz, 261 B.R. 32, 35 (Bankr. 
D. Idaho 2001), In re Dever, 250 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000), and In re 
Jackson, No. 12-9635-RLM-7A, 2013 WL 3155595, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. June 20, 
2013). 
10
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finding that because the CTC contained a high-income threshold of $110,000, 
Congress did not intend for the CTC to be “a form of public assistance legis-
lation.”101 
More recently, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana ruled in In re Jackson that although the ACTC and the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (“EITC”) were both refundable credits, they served very 
different purposes.102  The EITC is a refundable tax credit designed as an 
antipoverty program.103  The EITC is available to low-income wage earners 
and has been found by bankruptcy courts across the country to be a public 
assistance benefit.104  The EITC was primarily enacted to provide economic 
relief to low-income taxpayers while the ACTC was designed to aid a larger 
portion of taxpayers with higher-earned income thresholds.105  Under these 
circumstances, the court held that the EITC and the ACTC should not be 
treated similarly in bankruptcy because they provide different functions for 
taxpayers.106 
On the other side of the split, in In re Koch the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
for the Central District of Illinois found that it was possible to distinguish 
between the general CTC, which is nonrefundable, and the ACTC, which is 
refundable, for exemption purposes.107  Since the ACTC was added in 2001, 
it has provided additional government aid for low-income taxpayers.108  The 
court reasoned that “as structured, the additional child tax credit, refundable 
to taxpayers of limited financial means and serving to meet the basic needs of 
their dependent children, may be claimed exempt as a public assistance bene-
fit.”109  The court in Koch concluded that the debtor was allowed to claim the 
ACTC as exempt, but not the general CTC.110  Koch was decided only two 
years after Steinmetz; however, as the court in Koch pointed out, the first ma-
jor amendments to the CTC were adopted after In re Steinmetz was decid-
ed.111 
 
 101. In re Steinmetz, 261 B.R. at 35. 
 102. 2013 WL 3155595, at *2; I.R.C. § 32 (2012). 
 103. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44057, THE 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (2015). 
 104. Id.  See also In re Hatch, 519 B.R. at 790; In re Corbett, No. 13–60042, 2013 
WL 1344717, at *8  (Bankr. W.D. Mo., Apr. 2, 2013); In re Goldsberry, 142 B.R. 
158, 159 (Bankr. E.D. Ky 1992) (“[E]arned income credit is a money grant to poor 
working families with dependent children, that it therefore fits within the definition of 
‘public assistance’ and is exempt under [KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §] 205.220(3).”). 
 105. In re Jackson, 2013 WL 3155595, at *2. 
 106. Id. 
 107. In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 527–28 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 108. Id. at 528. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 527–28. 
 111. Id. at 528.  Since Koch, another court in Illinois reached a similar result in In 
re Vazquez.  516 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).  In 2014, the Vazquez court held 
that because the ACTC was available only for low-income taxpayers as a refund, the 
11
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the original bankruptcy court case, Ms. Hardy’s petition was consoli-
dated with another Chapter 13 debtor’s case in order to determine the inclu-
sion of the CTC as a public assistance benefit.112  In holding that the CTC 
was not a public assistance benefit, the bankruptcy court relied on previous 
bankruptcy court opinions in finding that the legislative intent behind the 
CTC did not fit within the definition of a public assistance benefit.113  On 
appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision, again relying on past case law examining the 
legislative intent of the CTC as enacted in 1997.114  Ms. Hardy appealed the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s judgment to the Eighth Circuit.115 
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the issue before the court was “whether 
a portion of a tax refund based on the ACTC is exempt from the bankruptcy 
estate as a public assistance benefit under Missouri law.”116  In framing the 
holding, the court first addressed the Missouri exemption statute, Missouri 
Revised Statutes Section 513.430.1(10)(a), and sought to establish a defini-
tion for a public assistance benefit under Missouri law.117  Because the ex-
emption statute provided no definition for a public assistance benefit, the 
court sought out the intent of the legislature through the term’s plain mean-
ing.118  Ultimately, the court agreed with the definition set out by the Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel below, stating, “‘public assistance benefits’ are those 
government benefits provided to the needy.”119 
The court then analyzed whether the ACTC fits within this definition of 
“public assistance benefits.”120  In order to make this determination, the court 
looked to the intent of the legislature, the history of the statute, and the “oper-
ation of the statute in practice.”121  In finding that the ACTC fit within the 
public assistance benefit exemption, the court explained its rationale based on 
 
analysis in Koch remained valid.  Id. at 527.  The court in Vazquez compared the 
analysis of Koch with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in Hardy and opined 
that it was not the court’s responsibility to “decide the parameters and limits of ex-
emptions or other forms of government assistance unless a legislative body delegates 
that authority to it.”  Id. at 526; see supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 112. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 113. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 115. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1192. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1193. 
 119. Id. (citing Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 725 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 
2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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the amendments to the ACTC since its creation in 1997.122  The court exam-
ined the initial intent behind the CTC: to reduce the tax burden of families 
and to promote family values.123  Since its enactment, however, the CTC has 
undergone substantial changes, changes the court found to “demonstrate that 
the tax credit has been modified to benefit low-income families.”124 
The court highlighted two major aspects of amendments to the CTC, 
making the refundable portion a public assistance benefit: (1) the addition of 
the refundable portion of the CTC and (2) the reduction of the refundability 
threshold from $10,000 to $3000.125  First, the court noted that while the 
CTC, as first enacted, was limited to families with three or more children, 
Congress eliminated the limit on the number of children and increased the 
CTC from $500 per qualifying child to $600 in 2001.126  The court indicated 
that while this amendment made the credit accessible to families with fewer 
than three children, the real foundational change to the CTC came with Con-
gress’s addition of the refundable ACTC.127  Second, the court emphasized 
the amendments Congress made to the ACTC between 2005 and 2008, in-
creasing the refundability percentage and lowering the refundability threshold 
from $10,000 to $3000.128  The court noted that this change in particular al-
lowed low-income taxpayers to claim a greater portion of the CTC as a re-
fund.129 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  The court looked specifically at the language in the legislative history of 
the statute, which stated: 
 
At its most basic, the original CTC statute allowed parents under a certain in-
come threshold to claim a nonrefundable credit of $500 per qualifying child. 
After MAGI meets that threshold—$55,000 married filing separately, $75,000 
head of household, and $110,000 married filing jointly—the credit is reduced 
by $50 per $1000 MAGI. 
 
Id. (citing Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §101, 111 Stat. 788, 
796–99). 
 124. Id. at 1194. 
 125. Id. at 1193–95 (citing Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 201, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47). 
 126. Id. at 1193 (Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 
201).  Congress also set up additional increases: 2001–2004 tax years: $600; 2005–
2008 tax years: $700; 2009 tax year: $800; and 2010 and after: $1000. Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 201. 
 127. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1193 (citing Economic Growth and Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act of 2001 § 201). 
 128. Id. at 1195 (citing American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-5, § 1003, 123 Stat. 115, 313 (2009)).  Adjusted for inflation based on 
2001 dollars.  Id. at 1194. 
 129. This is particularly beneficial to low-income taxpayers who may have very 
little tax liability.  Before the refundable portion of the CTC became available, any 
amount of the credit that low-income taxpayers could receive was limited to reducing 
their tax liability.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §101, 111 Stat. 
13
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The court reasoned that the only taxpayers who would receive the re-
fundable portion of the ACTC would be low-income individuals, as higher 
income taxpayers would not be eligible to receive a refund.130  The court also 
relied on comments made by members of Congress and Presidents Bush and 
Obama in passing the amendments to the CTC.131  The court cited Senator 
Snowe, who sought to explain the legislation’s effect: 
In its original form, the tax relief plan would not have reached all 
fulltime workers—the tax reduction would have disappeared for 
wageearners [sic] with net incomes of less than about $22,000.  In-
deed, without refundability, there are almost 16 million children 
whose families would not benefit from the doubling of the Child Tax 
Credit.132 
The court also acknowledged Congress’s reduction of the threshold re-
fund eligibility amount from $10,000 to $8500 in 2008 and then down to 
$3000 in 2009.133  In fact, the court found the 2008 and 2009 amendments to 
be particularly instructive regarding the legislative intent behind the CTC.134  
The court stated, “These amendments substantially shifted the balance be-
tween providing incentives for taxpayers to earn income, on the one hand, 
and simply providing benefits to the needy, on the other.”135 
In summarizing the analysis of the legislative history and intent of the 
CTC and ACTC, the court concluded, “the intent of the legislature when 
 
788, 796–99.  Therefore, if a taxpayer qualified for a $2000 CTC but only had $500 
in actual tax liability, the taxpayer could only recognize $500 of the credit.  See id. 
 130. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1194.  The CTC begins to phase out at $55,000 for 
married taxpayers filing separately; $75,000 for head of household taxpayers; and 
$110,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 101.  
However, even many taxpayers who are below these phase-out amounts do not re-
ceive the full credit amount as a refund because the majority of their credit would be 
used to reduce tax liability.  See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41873, THE CHILD TAX CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2 
(2014). 
 131. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1194–95 (citing comments from Senators Boxer, 
Snowe, Wellstone, and Baucus and statements made by President Bush and President 
Obama).  “The child credit expansion to low-income families is immediate.  Over 16 
million more children will be helped by the provisions of this bill.”  Id. (quoting 147 
CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001)) (statement of Sen. Charles “Chuck” Grassley).  See 
also 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statements of Sen. Paul Wellstone); 147 
CONG. REC. S5028-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus); Remarks on Signing 
the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. S27; Statement by 
President Obama Upon Signing H.R. 4853, 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. S41. 
 132. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1194 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) 
(statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe)). 
 133. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1195. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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modifying the ACTC was to benefit low-income families.  The ACTC has 
fulfilled Congress’s goals.  In practice, it appears to overwhelmingly benefit 
low-income families.”136  The court also concluded that the inclusion of the 
ACTC as a public assistance benefit was supported by a number of bankrupt-
cy courts that have addressed the issue.137  Finally, the court acknowledged 
that not all other courts have reached the same conclusion but opined that the 
courts which drew the opposite conclusion had not adequately taken into ac-
count the many amendments to the CTC and the clear legislative intent be-
hind the changes.138  The court ultimately concluded: 
Here, the [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel] focused too narrowly on the 
CTC as originally enacted.  It is necessary to also consider the various 
statutory amendments that modified the refundable portion of the 
credit—the portion of the credit at issue in this case.  These modifica-
tions demonstrate Congress intended to benefit the needy with the 
ACTC.  Accordingly, we find the ACTC meets the Missouri exemp-
tion requirement of a public assistance benefit.139 
The court found that the amendments to the original CTC that created a 
refundable portion of the credit were intended to benefit the “needy.”140  The 
court also found that public assistance benefits under Section 
513.430.1(10)(a)141 consisted of those government benefits intended to be 
provided to the “needy.”142  Therefore, the court concluded that the refunda-
ble portion of the CTC met the Missouri exemption requirement for a public 
assistance benefit.143 
V.  COMMENT 
Whether the Hardy decision was correctly decided depends on both the 
policies underlying bankruptcy exemptions generally, as well as the purpose 
and scope of the exemption for the public assistance benefits specifically.  
This Part explores these interrelated questions in turn.  The court in Hardy 
accepted that public assistance benefits were exemptible from the bankruptcy 
estate because they were listed in the Missouri exemption statute.  But, in 
order to fully evaluate whether the Hardy decision was correctly decided, a 
frame of analysis is necessary to examine the purposes behind bankruptcy 
exemptions generally.  Policymakers agree that the primary purpose of bank-
ruptcy exemptions is to provide debtors with the bare necessities of life fol-
 
 136. Id. at 1196. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1197. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a) (West 2016). 
 142. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1197. 
 143. Id. 
15
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lowing bankruptcy.144  Yet, there is a vigorous debate over exactly which 
property should be exempt from the reach of creditors.145 
A.  The Purposes of Bankruptcy Exemption Statutes 
Recall that debtors are generally entitled to choose between the federal 
exemption scheme outlined in Section 522(d) of the bankruptcy code or the 
exemptions of the state in which they reside.146  The bankruptcy statute also 
allows each state to opt out of the federal exemption statute and instead re-
quires debtors to use that state’s exemptions.147  Although Missouri has opted 
out of the federal exemption statute,148 its exemptions are not significantly 
different.  In fact, both the federal statute and the Missouri exemption statute 
have come to many of the same conclusions regarding the assets and property 
that allow debtors to maintain a sufficient standard of living following bank-
ruptcy.149  Missouri’s exemption scheme and the federal exemption scheme 
have very similar language for the exemptions of public assistance bene-
fits.150 
Professor Alan Resnick, a leading bankruptcy scholar, has established a 
nuanced framework for understanding the basic purposes of bankruptcy ex-
emption laws: 
1. To provide a debtor enough money to survive. 
2. To protect his dignity and his cultural and religious identity. 
3. To afford a means of financial rehabilitation. 
 
 144. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 169 (5th ed. 2006) (“The law of every state makes at least some property 
exempt from execution and other legal process so that no debtor can be reduced to 
absolute destitution.”). 
 145. See generally David Gray Carlson, The Role of Valuation in Federal Bank-
ruptcy Exemption Process: The Supreme Court Reads Schedule C, 18 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 461 (2010); Heather M. Forrest, Are Bankruptcy-Specific State Exemp-
tions Constitutional?, 31-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (2012); Timothy D. Moratzka, 
Fresh Start, Head Start, or Running Start: Bankruptcy Exemption Planning, 22-APR 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (2003). 
 146. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 147. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (b)(2) (West 2016) (“Property listed in this paragraph is 
property that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable 
to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize.”). 
 148. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.427 (2000). 
 149. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.430 (West 2016); 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d). 
 150. Compare MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a) (“A Social Security benefit, 
unemployment compensation or a public assistance benefit”), with 11 U.S.C.A. § 
522(d)(10)(A) (“a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local 
public assistance benefit”). 
16
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4. To protect the family unit from impoverishment. 
5. To spread the burden of the debtor’s support from society to his 
creditors.151  
Does the inclusion of public assistance benefits in bankruptcy exemption 
statutes satisfy these five purposes laid out by Professor Resnick? 
First, public assistance benefits, by definition, provide aid and assistance 
to the public in need;152 therefore, under Professor Resnick’s framework, 
public assistance benefits work to support debtors in providing some amount 
of money for them to survive.  Moreover, public assistance benefits allow 
debtors to protect their cultural and religious identities by providing debtors 
with revenue that allows them to maintain their cultural and religious mem-
berships and community involvement, even during their bankruptcy.153 
In addition, aid from public assistance benefits contributes to debtors’ 
rehabilitation after their bankruptcy, as public assistance benefits are cash 
payments that, as exempt from the bankruptcy estate, debtors can use to pre-
 
 151. In re Hahn, 5 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980) (citing Alan Resnick, 
Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase 
or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 621 
(1978)).  This framework has been cited by several sources, including: 2 Bankruptcy 
Desk Guide § 13:11, Editor’s Comment (March 2016); Matter of Hahn, 5 B.R. 242, 2 
Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 761 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980); In re Ellingson, 63 B.R. 
271, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶71281 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); Honorable William 
Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption Limitations: The 
“Opt-Out” as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149 
(1997); Georgianne L. Huckfeldt, Conversion of Nonexempt Assets to Exempt Assets 
Prior to Bankruptcy—A Question of Fraud?, 56 MO. L. REV. 857 (1991); Matthew J. 
Kemmer, Personal Bankruptcy Discharge and Myth of the Unchecked Homestead 
Exemption, 56 MO. L. REV. 683 (1991). 
 152. A dictionary definition of “public assistance” is: “government aid to needy, 
aged, or disabled persons and to dependent children.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (11th ed. 2012). 
 153. Professor Resnick illustrates the importance of protecting cultural and reli-
gious identities in bankruptcy, stating: 
 
Most people have property which has significant sentimental value greatly 
outweighing its monetary worth.  If an item has important subjective value to 
the debtor and would realize a relatively small amount of money on liquida-
tion, respect for the item’s personal worth to the debtor should dictate that the 
property be exempt from the creditor’s grasp. 
This rationale justifies many of the exemption laws today, including those for 
Bibles, family pictures, wedding rings and other jewelry, books, cemetery 
plots, seats occupied in places of worship, and domestic pets.  The importance 
of these items is not their monetary value nor the physical survival of the 
debtor; they relate instead to the cultural, religious, and moral aspects of life 
which should be preserved despite the debtor’s financial hardship. 
 
Resnick, supra note 151, at 623–24. 
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vent new debts from arising.  In a similar vein, because public assistance ben-
efits are exempt, they provide money to debtors to prevent families from be-
coming impoverished.  Finally, public assistance benefits provide debtors 
with support that fulfills all four other purposes and, in doing so, limits the 
burden on society by allowing debtors to maintain a sufficient standard of 
living during bankruptcy and encourages financial independence post-
bankruptcy.  Thus, it seems clear that public assistance benefits fit squarely 
within the policy justifications underlying exemptions in bankruptcy general-
ly.154 
B.  The Additional Child Tax Credit as a Public Assistance Benefit 
The next step is to ascertain whether the court in Hardy correctly cate-
gorized the CTC as a public assistance benefit.  Although the Hardy court 
points out multiple definitions of a public assistance benefit, at its core, a 
public assistance benefit is a program designed to help the “needy” survive at 
a subsistence level.155  How does the CTC work to accomplish this goal? 
Following the same framework Professor Resnick established to evalu-
ate the purposes of exemptions in the bankruptcy code generally, the CTC 
should fulfill the same five purposes in order to qualify as a public assistance 
benefit exemption.  First, a refundable tax credit would provide debtors with 
an additional amount of money to sustain their family, albeit a fairly small 
amount in some cases.  Additionally, the ACTC is limited by income and by 
the number of qualifying children that taxpayers have, making the credit even 
smaller and less widely available.  For example, Ms. Hardy’s refundable 
ACTC was only $2000.156  This refund does not dramatically affect Ms. Har-
dy’s disposable income or markedly improve her ability to pay back her cred-
itors.  This small refund, if added to her bankruptcy estate, probably would 
not appreciably change the payout to creditors; however, as exempt property, 
this refund could make a huge difference to her family, given that Ms. Har-
dy’s family is living on a very small fixed income, now made more limited by 
Ms. Hardy’s bankruptcy filing.  The first and fourth purposes fit together in 
this way: the purposes of exemption laws in allowing for a sufficient standard 
of living and preventing impoverishment can be advanced simultaneously 
with the exemption of the refundable ACTC and the allowance for such funds 
to be used to support the family instead of debtors’ creditors. 
Second, public assistance benefits are important to the purpose of pro-
tecting debtors’ dignity and identity.  The CTC in particular was enacted to 
promote family values and has been amended to support low-income families 
 
 154. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §11-603(3) (West 2016); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/12-1001(g)(1) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8)(a) (West 2016); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 513.430.1(10)(a). 
 155. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 156. In re Hardy, 495 B.R. 440, 442 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2013), aff’d, 503 B.R. 722 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 1189. 
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because raising children is neither cheap nor easy.157  Allowing the ACTC to 
be exempted in bankruptcy can provide parents small amounts of funds to 
support and nurture their cultural and religious identity.  Section 1325 of the 
Code allows for the inclusion of charitable contributions in calculating debt-
ors’ disposable income, so long as the contributions “meet the definition of 
‘charitable contribution’ under section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or 
charitable entity or organization . . . in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of 
gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are 
made.”158 
Third, exemptions of retirement accounts, social security benefits, and 
other public assistance benefits from the bankruptcy estate allow debtors a 
means to rehabilitate their financial situation after the close of their bankrupt-
cy proceedings.  Public assistance benefits are particularly useful for the pur-
pose of providing for financial rehabilitation because they can allow debtors 
to maintain a sufficient standard of living during their bankruptcy without 
incurring further debt or financial stress. 
Finally, as Professor Resnick argues, “Assuming that exemptions are 
necessary and effective in the financial rehabilitation of debtors, if state and 
federal governments did not grant any exemptions, society would have to 
support debtors in the form of welfare payments.”159  The ACTC is not a wel-
fare program.  Instead, it works as a bonus for working parents who are rais-
ing families and gives them an incentive to earn income and maintain a con-
stant source of revenue to provide for their families.  Resnick’s concerns 
about reliance on welfare are not affected by allowing for the exemption of 
the ACTC.  For example, in Ms. Hardy’s situation, the $2000 ACTC that she 
receives would not work to support her or her family for very long.  There-
fore, Ms. Hardy’s reliance on society is minimal and is in no way increased 
by the exemption of the ACTC amount. 
C.  The Legislative Intent and Practical Application of the Child Tax 
Credit 
A major concern that many bankruptcy courts have expressed regarding 
the ACTC as a public assistance benefit revolves around the credit’s accessi-
bility to middle- and upper-income taxpayers.160  Because the phase-out 
 
 157. See 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe); 
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 101–02, 118 Stat. 
1166, 1167–68; Remarks on Signing the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, 
2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. S27; Statement by President Obama Upon Signing H.R. 4853, 
2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. S41. 
 158. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West). 
 159. Resnick, supra note 151, at 626. 
 160. See In re Hardy, 495 B.R. at 447; In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 725–26; In re 
Dever, 250 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000); In re Law, 336 B.R. 780, 783 n.2 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). 
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threshold begins at fairly high-income rates,161 many courts have argued that 
the CTC is not intended as a benefit for just low-income taxpayers.162  How-
ever, taxpayers with incomes reaching the phase-out threshold would likely 
use the CTC to offset tax liability and would not actually have any refundable 
portion.163  For such taxpayers, using the CTC to offset tax liability would not 
be a public assistance benefit.  The nonrefundable credit under the original 
legislative intent was to provide a tax break for families to promote family 
values.164 
There is no question that the nonrefundable CTC is not a public assis-
tance benefit itself.  However, the refundable ACTC is different.  The ACTC 
was adopted as a refundable portion of the CTC, but it was clearly adopted 
under a different legislative intent.  The ACTC is entirely based on the tax-
payers’ incomes and works to provide a refund for taxpayers with limited tax 
liability.165  The amendments alone do not necessarily indicate the evolution 
of the CTC into a public assistance benefit.  However, it does indicate that as 
Congress has amended the CTC, adding a refundable portion to the CTC and 
allowing for the CTC to be “available to all families with qualifying chil-
dren,”166 the legislative intent behind this credit has evolved to be “a key to 
helping children in low-income families.”167 
The aspect of the CTC that more readily lends itself to fitting within the 
realm of a public assistance benefit is the “refundability threshold.”168  As 
amended, the threshold for the refundable portion of the CTC begins at $3000 
 
 161. See supra note 88.  The threshold income amounts are: $55,000 for married 
filing separately; $75,000 for head of household; and $110,000 for married filing 
jointly.  I.R.C. § 24(b)(2) (West 2016).  This threshold is the point in a taxpayer’s 
income where the credit begins to be scaled down – $50 for every $1000 above the 
threshold amount.  Id. 
 162. See In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 726 (quoting In re Koch, 299 B.R. 523, 528 
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003)) (“‘Rarely will a middle or an upper-income level taxpayer 
receive a refund of the child tax credit.’  However, ‘rarely’ is not the same as ‘never,’ 
and the court did not explain how the record before it supported this conclusion.”). 
 163. See generally CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 130. 
 164. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 310 (1997). 
 165. Senator Snowe explained the purpose of the ACTC as: 
 
In its original form, the tax relief plan would not have reached all fulltime 
workers—the tax reduction would have disappeared for wage-earners with net 
incomes of less than about $22,000.  Indeed, without refundability, there are 
almost 16 million children whose families would not benefit from the dou-
bling of the Child Tax Credit. 
 
147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe). 
 166. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 787 F.3d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
211, 115 Stat. 38, 45–47). 
 167. 147 CONG. REC. S5770-01 (2001) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer). 
 168. CRANDALL-HOLLICK supra note 130, at 1. 
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of earned income.169  Additionally, the refundability rate of fifteen percent 
means that “[f]or every dollar of earnings above [the $3000 refundability 
threshold], the value of the taxpayer’s ACTC increases by 15 cents, up to the 
maximum amount.”170  This means the minimum income required to start 
receiving an ACTC credit is $3001 per year.  The court in Hardy found these 
amendments in 2008 and 2009 to be the defining moment when the CTC 
became a public assistance benefit, highlighting the shift in balance between 
providing incentives to taxpayers, as the CTC was originally enacted, and 
providing benefits to the needy, made possible through the enactment of the 
refundable ACTC.171 
Therefore, the ACTC overwhelmingly works to fulfill the five purposes 
of exemption laws as Professor Resnick lays them out.  As such, its exemp-
tion from the bankruptcy estate for Ms. Hardy, and many other debtors in 
bankruptcy, does more good for people than it can do as part of the bankrupt-
cy estate.  The ACTC, as currently enacted, works much like the EITC, 
providing tax refunds based on earned income rather than simply as an incen-
tive for having a family.172 
While the court in Hardy appears to have reached the correct decision, 
this decision alone does not go far enough to help debtors or to clarify the 
ambiguous language of the statutes for courts.  Because the Eighth Circuit is 
the first appellate court to address this issue, there is still a large split of au-
thority among the lower courts.173  As such, the controlling statutes need to be 
amended and clarified because there is no indication that other courts will 
follow the Hardy ruling in the future.174  This Note proposes an amendment 
to the Missouri exemption statute with the intent to clarify Missouri’s exemp-
tion scheme and with the hope that it can be seen as a template for other simi-
larly ambiguous state and federal exemption statutes.  Section 
513.430.1(10)(a) should be amended as follows: 
(10) Such person’s right to receive: 
(a) A Social Security benefit, unemployment compensation or a public 
assistance benefit, including but not limited to: 
(i) The refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit (additional 
Child Tax Credit) as found in I.R.C. §24; 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 4. 
 171. In re Hardy, 787 F.3d at 1193. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See supra Part III.C. 
 174. Uniformity in state exemption statutes would resolve some of the ambiguity 
and inconsistencies in the lower courts.  For an analysis of the need for uniformity in 
bankruptcy legislation, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-
Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformi-
ty, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 361 (2014). 
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(ii) The Earned Income Tax Credit as found in I.R.C. §32; and 
(iii) The Adoption Tax Credit as found in I.R.C. §23. 
As amended, this statute would provide clearer boundaries for the defi-
nition of public assistance benefits and will provide guidance to future courts 
and debtors in bankruptcy cases.  The addition of “including but not limited 
to” provides for the possibility of additional public assistance benefits to fit 
within the statute, while also preventing further confusion in interpreting and 
defining such terms of art as public assistance benefits.  Finally, this amend-
ment would serve as a template for other ambiguous exemption statutes 
across the country in preventing misuse or continued ambiguous interpreta-
tion of statutory language that can so directly and drastically affect debtors’ 
lives during their bankruptcy. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit was correct in its decision that the ACTC qualifies as 
a public assistance benefit for the purposes of Missouri’s exemption scheme 
in bankruptcy filings.  However, the Eighth Circuit is the first appellate court 
to set a precedent allowing the ACTC to be exempted from a bankruptcy es-
tate under the public assistance benefits exemption.  The court’s holding does 
not resolve the uncertainty revolving around the definition of public assis-
tance benefits in exemption statutes across the country. 
This Note attempts to clarify the definition by providing an amendment 
to the Missouri statute consistent with the purposes underlying bankruptcy 
exemptions.  One goal of this Note is to encourage other states, as well as 
Congress, to make similar amendments to their exemption statutes so that 
already overburdened courts have one less issue to wade through in dealing 
with bankruptcy cases.  Even while bankruptcy-filing rates are finally begin-
ning to drop, there are still large portions of the population filing for bank-
ruptcy each year.  Bankruptcy exemption statutes seek to strike the balance 
between holding debtors accountable for their outstanding debts and provid-
ing relief from extensive and crippling debt.  The exemption of public assis-
tance benefits can make a huge difference for low-income debtors who quali-
fy for such benefits, even in small sums like in the ACTC, without undermin-
ing the balanced intent of the bankruptcy code. 
 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/10
